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We employ a ‘reverse-engineering’ approach to illuminate the neurocomputational building 
blocks that combine to support controlled semantic cognition: the storage and context-
appropriate use of conceptual knowledge. By systematically varying the structure of a 
computational model and assessing the functional consequences, we identified the architectural 
properties that best promote some core functions of the semantic system. Semantic cognition 
presents a challenging test case as the brain must achieve two seemingly contradictory functions: 
abstracting context-invariant conceptual representations across time and modalities, whilst 
producing specific context-sensitive behaviours appropriate for the immediate task. These 
functions were best achieved in models possessing a single, deep multimodal hub with sparse 
connections from modality-specific regions, and control systems acting on peripheral rather than 
deep network layers. The reverse-engineered model provides a unifying account of core findings 
in the cognitive neuroscience of controlled semantic cognition, including evidence from 




At heart, cognitive neuroscience is an effort to understand how mental representations and 
processes arise from, and relate to, underlying neural mechanisms. Toward this goal, researchers 
typically begin by seeking relationships between neural data (neurophysiological activity and/or 
neuropathology) and patterns of behaviour in various tasks. Here we employ an alternative 
‘reverse-engineering’ approach that first considers the functions that a given cognitive system 
must support and then evaluates what neuro-computational machinery best achieves those 
functions. By systematically varying structure within a computer simulation and assessing the 
functional consequences, one can establish the architectural elements critical to the targeted 
functions, potentially explaining why the system is organised in a particular way. 
We apply this approach to understand the cortical network underlying semantic cognition, the 
controlled access to and manipulation of conceptual knowledge or meaning1,2. Semantic 
cognition provides a challenging test case because the system must concurrently achieve two 
functions that appear diametrically opposed. First, it must abstract over episodes and across time 
to acquire context-independent representations that express conceptual similarity structure and 
thereby promote knowledge generalisation across items and contexts1,3,4. This ‘conceptual 
abstraction’ supports the ability to discern conceptual similarity amongst items denoted by 
images, words, or other attributes, despite sometimes dramatic variability in their surface 
properties4-6. For instance, if one learns that wolves are dangerous after being attacked in the 
woods, this knowledge should generalise to a different wolf on a farm or in the house promoting 
the inference ‘dangerous’ for all wolves. Second, the system must flexibly adapt semantic 
representations to suit immediate task demands1,5,7,8 - differentiating wolves and dogs when 
generating an inference about safety, but treating them similarly to infer physical appearance. 
Thus, the subset of features governing the similarity space and consequent generalisation in the 
moment must also be context-sensitive. 
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Whilst the literature currently advances several hypotheses about the cortical architecture of the 
semantic system, no prior work has compared their ability to simultaneously achieve conceptual 
abstraction and context-sensitivity. Interestingly, the extant hypotheses are variants of a central 
idea dating back at least to Wernicke: that semantic knowledge arises from interactions amongst 
various surface representations (sensory, motor, linguistic, affective, etc.) distributed throughout 
cortex9. They differ principally in their proposals about the pathways through which these 
surface representations interact. Consequently, they can be contrasted using computer 
simulations with a family of neural network models, all learning to compute the same interactive 
mappings amongst various surface representations, but differing in their architecture. 
Illuminating the architectural elements that best support both conceptual abstraction and context 
sensitivity, generates a cognitively- and computationally-motivated hypothesis about cortical 
network structure that can be weighed against critical empirical evidence, including (1) extant 
data about the anatomy of the cortical semantic system, (2) differing patterns of semantic 
impairment arising from damage to representation10-12 versus control2,13 systems, and (3) key 
functional brain imaging results from the study of semantic cognition under conditions of 
control14,15. The rest of this paper reports such an analysis, arriving at a model of controlled 
semantic cognition that provides a unified account of these disparate phenomena. 
Core functions for semantic cognition. Research in semantic cognition has largely focused on 
how we acquire representations that capture conceptual structure from sensory, motor, and 
linguistic inputs that do not transparently reflect such structure (i.e., conceptual abstraction). This 
ability is thought to arise from sensitivity to patterns of covariation in experience16. While birds 
vary wildly in appearance, they possess properties that covary: feathers, beaks, wings, flying 
ability, the name “bird,” etc. Many otherwise competing theories agree that the human semantic 
system detects and exploits such structure, representing items as conceptually similar when they 
share coherently-covarying properties, even if they differ in many other respects6,17,18. By this 
view, concepts reflect clusters in the high-order covariance structure of experience. 
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This idea becomes challenging, however, when one considers how the various properties 
purported to co-occur in experience are distributed across learning episodes. While birds 
typically possess the abilities to fly and lay eggs, those behaviours do not directly co-occur: a bird 
laying an egg is not flying, and vice versa6. Each experience provides only partial exposure to an 
item’s properties. Moreover, such exposure can be highly context- and modality-specific; for 
instance, learning that birds have hollow bones only via verbal statements in science class. Thus, 
conceptual abstraction relies upon extracting the relevant covariances across many different 
episodes over time, each providing only limited, context-bound access to a subset of properties: 
the system must track sameness in kind across contexts and experiences to detect that the flying 
item observed in one episode is similar to an item labelled “bird” in another. 
This requirement to form representations abstracted across items, modalities and contexts seems 
at odds with the second core function of semantic cognition, context-sensitivity. Context-
appropriate behaviour requires flexible construction of task-relevant similarity structure, as 
different subsets of features and aspects of meaning are crucial in different contexts, whilst other 
often more dominant meanings must be inhibited1,6. For instance, representing a piano and a 
computer keyboard as similar when generating action plans, but dissimilar when generating 
inferences about their weight. This flexibility underlies construction of ad-hoc categories, e.g., 
‘things that fit in a pocket’19, and the tendency for new learning to generalise differently 
depending upon the nature of the information20. Often the context-appropriate behaviour 
requires access to a particular subset of features within a modality. For instance, the features 
relevant for moving a piano conflict with those relevant to playing it; accessing both 
simultaneously may produce an action inappropriate in strength or nature7. Likewise, naming a 
piano requires a highly specific output differing from the information required to draw it or 
mime its action. Thus, conceptual abstraction and context-sensitivity may appear diametrically 




These considerations highlight three core functions of the human semantic system that informed 
the design of our simulations: 
(1) It must acquire representations that capture overall conceptual similarity structure and 
not merely the perceptual, motor, and linguistic structure apparent within various modalities.  
(2) It must acquire context-independent conceptual representations from learning episodes 
that provide only partial context-specific information about an item’s properties. 
(3) It must adapt to context so as to generate only context-appropriate behaviours. 
 
Proposals about the neural architecture of semantic representation. Hypotheses about the 
architecture of the semantic network abound, but few have been specified with sufficient 
mechanistic precision to compare and contrast their implications for understanding conceptual 
abstraction and context-sensitivity (though see6). The reverse-engineering approach we adopt, 
identifies a series of architectural ‘building blocks’ that distinguish various theories, then 
parametrically varies these to delineate a space of possible architectures that encompass some 
existing proposals, as well as hypotheses not typically considered. Formal comparison of the 
effects of each building block provides critical insight into hypotheses that have been articulated 
only verbally, and allows us to determine which possible model best supports both conceptual 
abstraction and context sensitivity. 
To identify the building blocks, we first considered how contemporary hypotheses about the 
cortical architecture of semantics vary. One view derives from Wernicke’s9 proposal that 
semantic processing reflects direct, interactive communication amongst various associated 
surface representations—perceptual, motor, linguistic, affective, and so on. This perspective 
foreshadows modern ‘embodied cognition’ views21,22 and has been explored computationally23-26. 
Other work emphasises the importance of multimodal ‘hub’ regions for mediating interactions 
between sensorimotor modalities. For instance, ‘convergence zones’ may connect different 
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modalities within a network that adopts multiple hubs, such as a pathway connecting visual and 
linguistic representations, another connecting visual and haptic representations, and so on27,28. 
Such hubs could be the sole vehicle for crossmodal communication, or could connect via a 
broader multimodal region, producing a hierarchical convergence of information across 
modalities. Whilst neither proposal has been investigated computationally, both have received 
support from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychological evidence27,29,30. Alternatively, the 
various representational modalities might all communicate via a single multimodal hub, an idea 
supported by convergent computational31,32, neuropsychological1,10,11, neuroimaging33,34, 
neurophysiological35,36 and neurostimulation37,38 evidence. 
With this landscape in mind, we considered two factors governing how modality-specific 
“spokes” connect to multimodal “hubs”. First, communication could be direct or involve one or 
more intermediating regions. Deeper models (possessing more layers between input and output) 
can acquire more complex representations and behaviours as attested by the recent explosion of 
research in deep neural networks39,40, and conceptual representations arise within the deepest 
layers of visual and language networks41-43. Thus, depth seems an important factor to consider. 
Second, network layers may connect only to immediately adjacent areas, or may additionally send 
direct ‘shortcut’ connections to anatomically distal regions, an analogue of white matter 
pathways. Such connectivity would need to be sparse due to cortical metabolic and packing 
constraints44,45. 
From these considerations we discern five building blocks that may influence the behaviour of 
the cortical semantic network: a) presence of multiple hubs connecting subsets of modality-
specific spokes, b) presence of a single multimodal hub, c) network depth, d) presence of 
shortcut connections, and e) hierarchical convergence across modalities. These building blocks 
combine in different ways to produce the space of candidate architectures shown in Figure 1 
(note, not all possible combinations are explored, only those relating to the theoretical literature 
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and allowing assessment of the impact of each building block). Importantly, all architectures 
employ identical inputs/outputs, and possess equal numbers of hidden units and connections, 
differing only in the pattern of connectivity amongst units. We assess how each building block 
impacts conceptual abstraction, first without and then with simultaneous context sensitivity, and 




The models were fully recurrent neural networks with activity unfolding over time, trained in the 
same learning environment to the same performance criterion (all output units within 0.2 of their 
targets), differing only in their connectivity (Figure 1). We created activation patterns for 16 
items in each of three ‘modalities’ (e.g., word, image, action) designed to capture the central 
challenge of conceptual abstraction: conceptual structure was latent in the relationship between 
unit activations across modalities but differed strongly from the structure apparent within each 
modality considered independently (Figure 2, see Methods). In an initial phase, models received 
input from a single modality and learned to reproduce the complete pattern across all three 
modalities (as in prior work25,31,46). In a second phase, a control signal was provided as an 
additional input to indicate different task contexts, and models learned to activate, from input in 
a single modality, only those output units both true of the item and relevant to the task. For 
context-sensitive simulations, the required output modality was designated by an additional input 
signal.  
To measure success in conceptual abstraction we computed a ‘true’ conceptual similarity matrix 
by concatenating the vectors from all three modalities for each item and tabulating the resulting 
correlations for all item pairs. We used this as the target matrix for the model representations in a 
representational similarity analysis47: for each model hidden layer, we correlated the pairwise 
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similarities in its activation patterns and the true conceptual similarities. The highest such 
correlation for each model indicated its overall success in abstracting conceptual structure (see 
Supplementary Notes 1 and 2 for further details). We considered how this ‘conceptual 
abstraction score’, and learning speed, varied with model architecture, with and without the 
additional requirement of context-sensitivity. We also assessed how well each model (1) captures 
the multimodal structure, ignoring the modality-specific structure, and (2) generalises newly-
learned conceptual and modality-specific information across contexts—however since these 
results align fully with the conceptual abstraction scores, they are reported in Supplementary 
Notes 3-5. The simulations strongly favoured one architecture, which we assessed in its ability to 
explain core phenomena in anatomical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies of 
controlled semantic cognition (Phase 3). 
Phase 1: Conceptual representation without control. Consistent with prior work6, phase 1 
models learned to generate, from input provided to any individual modality, the full pattern 
associated with the concept across all modalities. The models varied dramatically in their 
conceptual abstraction scores (F(6, 1273)=1168.575, p<.001; Figure 3, Table S1, significant 
contrasts had p<.001 throughout, Hedges g effect size and confidence intervals (CI) are 
reported). Scores were better when the architecture included some form of hub (Spokes-Only < 
Bimodal Hubs; t(718)=-38.763; g=3.064, CI =-.21383, -.19322) and better still with a multimodal 
hub (Bimodal Hubs < Shallow Multimodal Hub; t(718)=-46.634, g=2.877, CI=-.17007, -.15633). 
No evidence was found for an effect of depth (Shallow Multimodal Hub ~= Deep Multimodal 
Hub; t(105.648)=-0.645, p=.521, g=0.099, CI=-.01207, .00614) and hierarchical convergence 
had a significant detrimental effect compared to a single multimodal hub (Deep Multimodal Hub 
> Convergent Hubs; t(133.049)=22.503, g=3.558, CI=.16428, .19594; Multimodal Hub-plus-
Shortcut > Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(114.224)=11.436, g=1.808, CI=.06229, .08838). 
Addition of shortcut connections further improved performance for both deep architectures 
(Deep Multimodal Hub < Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut; t(138.57)=-5.444, g=0.861, CI=-
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.03815, -.01782; Convergent Hubs < Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(158)=-14.748, g=2.332, 
CI=-.15054, -.11498). Thus, the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut model performed better than all 
other architectures. 
The number of training epochs required to reach the performance criterion varied by 
architecture (F(6, 98)=39.307, Figure 4). The Spokes-Only structure learned fastest, with the 
presence of a hub increasing the time taken (Spokes-Only < Bimodal Hubs; t(14.163)=-13.057, 
g=4.768, CI=-18409, -13219), yet a multimodal hub decreasing it somewhat (Bimodal Hubs > 
Shallow Multimodal Hub; t(15.735)=9.545, g=3.485, CI=9238, 14522). Depth slowed training 
dramatically (Shallow Multimodal Hub < Deep Multimodal Hub; t(14.846)=-10.408, g=3.801, 
CI=-22042, -14543), but this slowing diminished substantially with shortcut connections (Deep 
Multimodal Hub > Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut; t(20.653)=7.152, g=2.612, CI=9827, 17896; 
Convergent Hubs > Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(15.581)=5.065, g=1.849, CI=9168, 
22417). There was no evidence hierarchical convergence affected learning time (Deep 
Multimodal Hub ~= Convergent Hubs; t(28)=-0.622, p=.539, g=0.227, CI=-9326, 4983; 
Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut ~= Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(28)=-0.213, p=.833, 
g=0.076, CI=-2557, 2076). 
The efficient abstraction of context-independent conceptual structure depended critically on the 
presence of one multimodal hub, resulting in the largest effects of all contrasts. Depth alone did 
not improve representation quality and greatly increased training time, but adding shortcut 
connections produced the highest-quality representation whilst speeding learning somewhat. An 
interim conclusion from Phase 1 is that conceptual abstraction benefitted from a single 
multimodal hub. 
Phase 2: Controlled semantic cognition. Phase 2 simulations addressed the full challenge of 
controlled semantic cognition - achieving context-independent conceptual abstraction when 
experiencing and generating a limited, context-sensitive subset of an item’s properties per 
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learning episode. Three additional context units were added, each coding the task-relevance of a 
modality. For instance, if modality 1 and 2 are important but modality 3 is not (e.g., picture 
naming requiring visual input and verbal output without action), context units 1 and 2 would be 
active. This Control Layer sent trainable unidirectional connections to all units, providing a 
simple way of implementing control as an influence of the current context on the flow of 
activation through the network to generate task-appropriate representations and behaviours6,48,49 
(Figure 5.A.). 
The models were trained to generate context-sensitive outputs from partial inputs for 16 items in 
each of 9 ‘tasks’, defined by specifying the relevant input/output modalities. Tasks could involve 
the same modality for both (e.g., word repetition), or one modality as input and another as 
output (e.g., picture naming). From the task representation and an item’s input features, the 
models learned to activate the item’s task-relevant features while keeping task-irrelevant features 
inactive. The models experienced a limited subset of an item’s features in any given training 
example, both in the inputs and outputs. 
Conceptual abstraction score varied substantially by architecture (F(6, 1673)=2326.016, Figure 3, 
Table S2). Bimodal hubs improved performance (Spokes-Only < Bimodal Hubs; t(611.94)=-
29.141, g=1.719, CI=-.07598, -.06639), but a multimodal hub performed still better (Bimodal 
Hubs < Shallow Multimodal Hub; t(718)=-59.050, g=4.668, CI=-.22886, -.21413). In contrast to 
Phase 1, depth significantly improved conceptual abstraction under conditions of control 
(Shallow Multimodal Hub < Deep Multimodal Hub; t(92.161)=-14.049, g=2.486, CI=-.16050, -
.12074). Hierarchical convergence dramatically reduced conceptual abstraction (Deep 
Multimodal Hub > Convergent Hubs; t(90.826)=37.123, g=5.984, CI=.35030, .38991; 
Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut > Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(137.278)=15.495, g=4.753, 
CI=.18296, .23648). Shortcut connections improved conceptual abstraction in both deep 
architectures (Deep Multimodal Hub < Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut; t(148.947)=-11.548, 
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g=1.826, CI=-.16490, -.11671; Convergent Hubs < Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; t(87.551)=-
26.027, g=4.638, CI=-.32419, -.27819). Only the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut architecture 
acquired representations significantly closer to the context-independent conceptual structure 
than the control structure (Supplementary Note 6).  
Training time varied by architecture (Figure 4; F(6,98)=113.036), with effects mimicking those 
observed without control. The Spokes-Only architecture was fastest, with a bimodal hub leading 
to slowing (Spokes-Only < Bimodal Hubs; t(14.504)=-15.720, g=5.752, CI=-7530, -5371), and a 
multimodal hub reducing this (Bimodal Hubs > Shallow Multimodal Hub; t(15.833)=9.424, 
g=3.441, CI=3145, 4973). Depth significantly slowed learning (Shallow Multimodal Hub < Deep 
Multimodal Hub; t(15.778)=-21.041, g=7.683, CI=-10121, -8267), yet shortcut connections 
alleviated this effect (Deep Multimodal Hub > Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut; 
t(28)=8.235,g=3.007, CI=3937, 6545; Convergent Hubs > Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; 
t(28)=6.077, g=2.219, CI=2759, 5565). There was no evidence that hierarchical convergence 
changed learning time (Deep Multimodal Hub ~= Convergent Hubs; t(28)=1.802, p=.576, 
g=0.658, CI=-146, 2280; Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut ~= Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut; 
t(28)=-0.017, p=1, g=0.006, CI=-1494, 1470).  
In these simulations, context units connected to all units in the semantic network, with their 
influence shaped by learning. In the best-performing Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut 
architecture, learned weights from control to the hub were smaller in magnitude than those 
projecting to shallower hidden (t(1517.275)=11.824, g=.507, CI=.50724, .70901) and spoke units 
(t(1512.273)=10.364, g=.445, CI=.43016, .63102) suggesting that control should operate on 
more superficial layers (Figure 5.B.). To test this, we compared models in which control 
connected only to Spokes, Hidden Layer 1, or Hidden Layer 2 units (Figure 5, Supplementary 
Note 7). Conceptual abstraction suffered when control operated on the multimodal hub 
compared to the spokes (t(127.713)=31.981, g=5.057, CI=.29835, .33770) or Hidden Layer 1 
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(t(149.191)=27.631, g=4.369, CI=.27904, .32202). There was no evidence these differed from 
one another (t(158)=2.089, p=.115, g=.330, CI=.00095, .03404). Moreover, control connectivity 
to just the spokes (t(138.78)=21.504, g=1.977, CI=.09496, .13063) or shallow hidden units 
(t(158)=9.493, g=1.501, CI=.07547, .11513) produced reliably better conceptual abstraction than 
control connecting to all layers, despite employing fewer connections; and only these models 
acquired internal representations significantly closer to the context-independent than context 
structure (Supplementary Note 6). There was no evidence that locus of control affected training 
time (F(2,42)=2.073, p=.139, η²=.090, CI=-1247.957, 729.690; -1952.690, 24.957; -1693.557, 
284.090). Thus, the reverse-engineering approach suggests that controlled semantic cognition, is 
best achieved within an architecture employing a single, deep multimodal hub and shortcut 
connections, with control systems acting on superficial rather than deep network components. 
Phase 3: Accounting for empirical phenomena with the reverse-engineered model. The 
reverse-engineered model differs from other proposals in a variety of ways, raising two 
questions. First, how does its structure accord with existing evidence about the anatomy of the 
cortical semantic network? Second, does the model help to explain important behavioural and 
neural phenomena in the study of controlled semantic cognition? We assessed these questions in 
phase 3. 
Anatomy. It is well known that the ventral ATL forms a multimodal conceptual hub, as 
demonstrated in SD10-12, brain imaging33,50-52, neurostimulation37,38 and intracortical electrode 
recording35,53. Indeed, this observation motivated the original hub-and-spoke view of semantic 
representation31. Additionally, the progression from unimodal perceptual representations to 
multimodal conceptual representations occurs in a graded fashion across many cortical areas51,54 
corresponding to a deep network. The simulations establish that such an architecture better 
promotes conceptual abstraction in conditions of context-sensitivity than other possible 
arrangements (including popular multi-hub theories27, see Discussion). 
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The reverse-engineered model suggests two additional properties that differ from prior models. 
First, it proposes sparse long-range “shortcut” connections connecting posterior modality-
specific regions directly to the multimodal hub, in addition to region-to-region connectivity. 
Both varieties of white-matter connection may be seen within the temporal lobe in assessments 
of the inferior longitudinal fasciculus55-57 and were highlighted within a detailed assessment of 
connectivity between anterior and posterior subsections of the fusiform gyrus58. Second, it 
suggests that neural systems of semantic control should connect with semantic regions primarily 
via more posterior regions distal to the anterior temporal hub. Whilst the literature does not 
definitively answer this question, the core ventral ATL hub region does have few connections to 
distal regions59,60. A connection from control regions to shallower areas of the semantic network, 
is highly consistent with observations from functional neuroimaging that control demands act 
upon spoke representations14. Thus, the reverse-engineered model is in high accord with known 
anatomy and provides a testable hypothesis as to the structural connectivity between control 
regions and the anterior temporal hub. 
Distinct neuropsychological syndromes. Damage to the anterior temporal hub versus frontal 
and temporoparietal control regions causes qualitatively distinct semantic syndromes, termed 
semantic dementia (SD) and semantic aphasia (SA) respectively10,12,13. Both produce comparably 
severe semantic deficits with frequent omissions in various tasks, but differ in errors of 
commission. Patients with SA more often generate context-inappropriate intrusions, producing 
associative errors (“acorn” for squirrel) and circumlocutions (“has stripes” for zebra) in naming, 
losing track of the target category in verbal fluency (e.g., for birds: robin, sparrow, chicken, pig), 
or failing to grasp a tool in a manner that affords its correct use in a given task context2,13,61. 
Patients with SD more often generate context-appropriate but semantically incorrect behaviours: 
committing coordinate (e.g., “horse” for zebra) or ordinacy (e.g., “animal” for squirrel) errors in 
naming, generating fewer but mainly correct items in verbal fluency, and grasping a tool correctly 
but exhibiting a semantically inappropriate use (e.g., brushing hair with a comb)2,10,13,62. Figure 6 
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shows these patterns for semantic fluency13 and picture naming63 from cohorts of each patient 
type studied in prior work. Does the reverse-engineered model explain these differences? 
To answer this question, we simulated disordered control in SA by adding noise to the control 
unit activations, and degraded representation in SD by removing a proportion of connections to, 
from and within the multimodal hub31. We simulated increasing levels of damage for each 
syndrome, matched for severity (indexed by total number of errors) and compared the relative 
frequency of three error types: omission (inactivation of a correct features), context-appropriate 
(activation of an incorrect task-relevant feature), and intrusion errors (activation of a task-
irrelevant feature). 
Damage to control produced fewer context-appropriate errors (damage type; F(1, 
190)=1292.758, η²=.540, CI=-376.230, -332.070; damage level; F(4,190)=128.784, η²=.215, CI=-
441.830, -30.670; -207.980, -163.820; -127.180, -83.020; -33.780, 10.380; interaction; 
F(4,190)=99.301, η²=.166) and more intrusion errors (damage type; F(1, 190)=2194.628, 
η²=.541, CI=320.775, 378.925; damage level; F(4,190)=168.893, η²=.245, CI=-54.975, 3.175; -
44.425, 13.725; -38.575, 19.575; -31.825, 26.325; interaction; F(4,190)=168.893, η²=.167) than 
damage to representation (across all damage levels, see Supplementary Note 8). There was no 
evidence for differences in feature omissions, with frequency reflecting damage severity (damage 
type; F(1,190)=0.613, p=.435, η²=.000, CI=-21.340, 26.440; damage level; F(4,190)=440.445, 
η²=.901, CI=-326.690, -278.910, 134.590, -86.810; 41.090, 6.690; -31.090, 16.690; interaction; 
F(4,190)=0.570, p=0.685, η²=.001). The reverse-engineered architecture accounts for the 
qualitatively different patterns of impaired semantic cognition arising from damage to control 
versus representational elements of the system identified in the patient data (Figure 6). 
Functional brain imaging. In classic neuroimaging experiments, participants viewed a stimulus 
(word or picture) and retrieved either the item’s colour or its action14. An identical stimulus 
elicited different functional activation depending on the task: engaging regions just anterior to 
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colour perception for colour retrieval and motion perception for action retrieval (Figure 7.a., also 
see64). To see whether the reverse-engineered model explains this effect, we contrasted activation 
for each hidden and output unit across two tasks using the same input (e.g., a ‘word’ in modality 
1) but differing outputs (e.g., a ‘colour’ in modality 2 or an ‘action’ in modality 3). In both the 
Spoke Layer and Hidden Layer 1, the ‘retrieve colour’ task activated ‘colour’ units more, while 
‘retrieve action’ activated ‘action’ units more (Figure 7.b., independent-samples t-tests per unit, 
all Bonferroni-corrected ps<.05). Consistent with the imaging, no evidence of differential 
activation was observed in the hub, the input modality spoke or its associated hidden units. 
Functional Connectivity. Recent evidence suggests functional connectivity between the ATL 
hub and modality-specific regions changes depending upon the information required for a 
task15,65. In one fMRI study participants judged social status or traits of faces15. Whilst ATL 
connectivity to the fusiform face area (i.e., the input spoke) was stable, functional connectivity to 
spokes associated with status- (IPL) or trait- (PCC) processing differed by task (Figure 7.c.). In 
the reverse-engineered model, we assessed the change in functional connectivity between the 
hub and spokes for two conditions with varying output requirements. Stimuli were always 
presented in modality 1 (‘faces’), but output was either in modality 2 (‘status’) or modality 3 
(‘trait’). T-tests contrasted the correlation strengths of the time series of the hub and each spoke 
region between contexts. There was no evidence for differential hub connectivity with the input 
spoke across contexts (t(158)=-0.568, p=1, g=.090, CI=-.08856, .04900), but connectivity to the 
two output spokes varied significantly (status vs. trait; Modality 2 ‘status’ spoke; t(158)=3.659, 
p=.001, g=.578, CI=.06227, .20837; Modality 3 ‘trait’ spoke; t(158)=-3.030, p=.009, g=.479, 
CI=-.18139, .03819). Thus, despite stable physical connectivity, task context effects on unit 




We applied a reverse-engineering approach to discover a neural network architecture capable of 
achieving the core, opposing functions of controlled semantic cognition: conceptual abstraction 
across modalities and contexts with simultaneous context-sensitivity. The optimal network had 
four important characteristics: (1) a multimodal hub only, (2) a deep architecture, (3) sparse 
shortcut connections, and (4) control operating on shallow rather than deep network 
components. The reverse-engineered model subsequently accounted for several disparate 
phenomena in controlled semantic cognition including the coarse anatomy of the temporal 
cortex, qualitative differences in error patterns observed in SD vs. SA, differential functional 
activation to the same stimulus depending on the task, and task-dependent shifts in functional 
connectivity between the ATL hub and sensory regions. In this discussion we consider why these 
architectural elements may be critical for conceptual abstraction and context-sensitivity, and 
implications for theories of controlled semantic cognition. 
Why a multimodal hub only?  Prior work established that feedforward neural networks exploit 
shared structure across modalities and contexts only when information from each gets passed 
through the same units and weights somewhere in the network, termed the ‘convergence 
principle’6,31. Here we show that convergence remains critical for learning structure in more 
neurobiologically-plausible recurrent networks: architectures lacking a single multimodal hub can 
learn the same input/output mappings, but do not acquire internal representations reflecting the 
full conceptual representational structure across modalities and learning episodes. Even models 
possessing a multimodal hub fail to learn the desired structure if they also possess shallower and 
more direct pathways between modalities as there is little pressure to use the connections 
mediating all modalities. These findings are problematic for distributed-only9,66 and multi-hub27,28 
theories of semantic cognition, but consistent with the hub and spoke theory31. The reverse-
engineered model merges the hub-and-spoke model with the controlled semantic cognition 
framework1,31 with the additional constraints of depth (also instantiated in41), shortcut 
connections and a shallow interface between control and representation systems. 
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Why should depth help? Deep networks can acquire complex internal representations that 
generalise well when trained on large corpora of naturally occurring stimuli67. Yet, only when 
required to generate context-sensitive outputs did the deeper model outperform the shallow 
model. Thus, depth particularly facilitates the ability to discover representational structure when 
learning involves experience with limited, context-dependent inputs and outputs. Context-
sensitive training pressures the system to represent the same item differently in different 
contexts, making it difficult for the system to exploit feature covariance across contexts. If the 
multimodal hub connects directly to unimodal representations, context strongly influences the 
representations. Likewise, a deep model in which the multimodal hub directly receives context 
inputs acquires context-bound representations. Only when the model is deep and control 
operates on the shallower elements is the hub sufficiently insulated from contextual information 
to acquire more context-invariant representations. 
Why shortcut connections? Deep networks initially learn slowly due to ‘vanishing’ or 
‘exploding’ gradients68: with many weights intervening between input and output (and little initial 
differentiation between inputs), changes to earlier weights may have negligible impact, so error-
driven learning produces minimal (or inordinately large) weight changes6,69. Even when sparse, 
shortcut connections significantly remediate this problem by propagating error through fewer 
layers to learn more quickly, increasing pattern differentiation and speeding overall learning.  
They also produce a concomitant improvement in conceptual abstraction, perhaps by roughly 
approximating the core structure in the environment or ‘warming up’ the deep hub early in a 
trial. A similar cortical mechanism may be in play, with an early feedforward sweep bringing the 
hub online and generating approximately correct states, followed by continued, iterative 
interaction between hub and spoke regions70,71.  
Accounting for distinct semantic syndromes. Simulated damage to control versus hub 
representations produced qualitatively similar damage to the error pattern found across SD and 
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SA: equivalent reductions in accuracy but more context-inappropriate intrusions following 
control damage and context-appropriate errors following representation damage. In the intact 
model, control can be viewed as “selecting” which properties matter for the task, potentiating 
context-relevant while suppressing context-irrelevant properties49. Context-sensitive responding 
arises from the joint influence of representational and control systems on surface properties. 
Distortion of the control signal incorrectly potentiates context-irrelevant units, allowing them to 
produce context-inappropriate behaviour. With damaged representations the intact control signal 
only potentiates context-appropriate features, but distorted feedback from the hub activates the 
wrong features within this subset, producing context-appropriate but semantically incorrect 
behaviours. 
Why separate systems for representation and control? A broad literature in 
neuropsychology, functional neuroimaging2,72,73, and connectivity74,75 suggests semantic 
representation and semantic control are supported by the interaction of anatomically and 
functionally segregated systems. The current work suggests why this might be. The hub-and-
spoke theory has long suggested that the anatomy of the temporal lobe promotes the extraction 
of conceptual structure across modalities and time in the multimodal hub.  The current work 
extends the set of anatomical features critical to support this function alongside the additional 
constraint of context-sensitivity. This ability is compromised when the hub region is strongly 
influenced by the immediate task context. Perhaps the gross segregation of systems for 
representation vs. control is evolution’s way of promoting acquisition of deep conceptual 
representations while preserving the flexibility required to think and act as the situation demands. 
 
Method 
Model Environment & Control 
Each concept consisted of 12 features in each of  
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3 modalities (M1, M2 and M3; see Figure 2). Concepts were constructed based on a critical 
aspect of conceptual structure; unimodal perceptual structures only weakly correlate with the 
conceptual structure which is more predictive but requires extraction across modalities. The 
model environment included four orthogonal structures; one distinct unimodal (based on 5 
perfectly correlated or anti-correlated features within a single modality) structure per modality 
(unimodal M1, unimodal M2 and unimodal M3) and a multimodal (based on 12 highly correlated 
features spread across all three modalities) structure. In each modality the unimodal structure is 
greater, yet overall, the multimodal structure is stronger. Whilst the main analyses focus on the 
full structure, highly consistent results are displayed for the unimodal and multimodal structures 
in Supplementary Notes 3 and 4. Input was always in a single modality, with the other two 
modalities set to 0. For simulations without control, the target was the full concept, resulting in 
48 versions of the 16 examples. For simulations with control, each concept was presented in one 
of three modalities with a control signal designating a required output in one of three modalities 
(as well as the input modality), resulting in 144 versions of the 16 examples. Task-irrelevant 
modalities had targets of 0.  
Model Architecture 
Code for replicating all simulations is available in the Supplementary Materials and at 
https://github.com/JacksonBecky/reverse-engineered-semantics. Additional code to process the 
results is available online. All architectures utilised a single framework, consisting of 12 pairs of 
input and output units per modality (connected on a one-to-one basis with a frozen weight of 6 
and a fixed bias of -3 for the output units), 60 hidden units and 3132 bidirectional connections 
with learnable weights. All learnable weights were initialised using the default LENS command 
resulting in small random weights (mean = 0, range =1). All hidden units employed a sigmoidal 
nonlinearity, scaling their activity between 0 and 1, in keeping with prior explorations of semantic 
representation6. Matching the number of resources allowed clear interpretation of the differences 
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between the architectures. All architectures had connections between the three modality-specific 
regions of the Spokes Layer and the six subsections of Hidden Layer 1 (with two subsections 
connected to each modality-specific spoke region) and within each portion of Hidden Layer 1. 
Deep architectures had connections from Hidden layer 1 to Hidden Layer 2 and within Hidden 
Layer 2. Whilst it may be noted that the modality-specific input-output regions are not 
technically ‘spokes’ without a hub, these sensorimotor regions are referred to as such across all 
the architectures for consistency. To match the number of connections between architectures, 
some connections were sparse (see Supplementary Method 1). Two factors varied between the 7 
model architectures; the hidden layer configuration (shallow; a single layer of 60 units vs. deep; 
one layer of 42 units and a deeper layer of 18 units) and the presence or absence of four types of 
connections (Direct Spoke Connections; connections between modality-specific output units in 
the Spokes Layer; Bimodal Hub Connections; connections between pairs of Hidden Layer 1 
regions that receive different modalities of input, resulting in the formation of bimodal hubs; 
Multimodal Hub Connections; connections between hidden units to form a single multimodal 
hub, either within Hidden Layer 1 or Hidden Layer 2; Shortcut Connections; direct but sparse 
shortcut connections between the Spokes Layer and Hidden Layer 2 that bypass Hidden Layer 
1). Although none of these models are of the depth typically associated with deep neural 
networks, employing two vs. one hidden layers reflects a great relative increase in depth and the 
term ‘deep’ is used here in the relative sense to distinguish the shallow and relatively deeper 
architectures. Whilst long-range connections are likely to be relatively sparse, their precise 
sparsity is not known. Shortcut Connections were included at a sparse but non-trivial proportion 
of 1 in 24 (although see Supplementary Note 9 for an assessment of systematically varying the 
sparsity within the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut architecture). 
Figure 1 represents each architecture. Three architectures were constructed from the shallow 
configuration; a ‘Spokes-Only’ architecture employing Direct Spoke Connections only, a 
‘Bimodal Hubs’ architecture with Bimodal Hub Connections only and a ‘Shallow Multimodal 
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Hub’ architecture with Multimodal hub Connections only, resulting in Hidden Layer 1 forming a 
single multimodal hub. All four deep architectures have Multimodal Hub Connections resulting 
in a multimodal hub in Hidden Layer 2. The ‘Deep Multimodal Hub’ architecture has no 
additional connections, thus three modality-specific routes connect via a deep multimodal hub. 
The ‘Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut’ architecture also included Shortcut Connections and the 
‘Convergent Hubs’ architecture included additional Bimodal Hub connections, resulting in 
hierarchical convergence as multiple bimodal hubs connect to a single deep multimodal hub. The 
‘Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut’ architecture combined the Bimodal Hub Connections, 
Multimodal Hub Connections and Shortcut Connections. The seven architectures allowed 
contrasts separating the effect of each architectural feature; the effects of a hub (Spokes-Only vs. 
Bimodal Hubs), a multimodal hub (Bimodal Hubs vs. Shallow Multimodal Hub), depth (Shallow 
Multimodal Hub vs. Deep Multimodal Hub), shortcut connections (Deep Multimodal Hub vs. 
Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut and Convergent Hubs vs. Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut) and 
hierarchical convergence (Deep Multimodal Hub vs. Convergent Hubs and Multimodal Hub-
plus-Shortcut vs. Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut).  
In Phase 2, a ‘Control Layer’ consisting of three units (each corresponding to one modality) was 
added to provide a context signal. The models had unidirectional learnable connections from the 
control units to the Spokes Layer, Hidden Layer 1 and Hidden Layer 2 (where present). Initially, 
no assumptions were made as to where control should connect, allowing a fair comparison 
across architectures. Following this analysis, the emergent reliance on the connections to each 
layer was investigated using an equal number of connections to all layers (81 per layer if shallow, 
54 per layer if deep). Then, the effectiveness of this emergent pattern was verified by contrasting 
versions of the model where the Control Layer was connected to each single layer (with the same 




The models were constructed and trained using the Light Efficient Network Simulator (LENS, 
version 2.63) software 76. Each simulation employed a fully recurrent network with 24 activity 
updates per example (6 time intervals and 4 ticks per time interval). Inputs were presented for 
the first 3 time intervals. Each training batch consisted of all examples presented once in a 
random order. At the end of each batch, error derivatives were calculated and all weights in the 
model adjusted by a small amount. All simulations employed the same training parameters, 
found to allow learning in pilot simulations. The models were trained using gradient descent with 
a learning rate of 0.001 and a weight decay parameter of 0.0001 with no momentum. Training 
ended when all output feature units were within 0.2 of their target. Thus, all architectures were 
matched on accuracy. Analyses were performed using the final time step of a test trial. Each 
simulation was performed 80 times. No power analysis was used to determine this sample size, 
however, it is much higher than typical modelling simulations (e.g.41). 
Assessment Metrics 
Data processing was performed in MATLAB and statistics in the Statistical Package for the 
Social Science (SPSS, 2013). The similarity structure of the models representations were 
compared to the ground-truth similarity structure to determine each architectures ability to 
accurately discover and represent the full structure in the environment. The critical example 
structure used to form this conceptual abstraction score is the ‘context-independent’ semantic 
representation structure (the relationships between examples based on the full set of features 
regardless of the current input or output domain). For the simulations with control it is also 
possible to look at the similarity of the representations to the context signal (context-only) or the 
full structure varying by context and concept (context-sensitive), see Supplementary Note 10.  
Correlation-based similarity matrices were constructed from the activity in a model region across 
all examples after learning. Model regions were defined as portions of the model with the same 
potential connections (before sparsity is taken in to account) as connectivity constrains 
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function44,78,79. This resulted in 3 Hidden Layer 1 regions in the Spokes-Only, Shallow 
Multimodal Hub, Deep Multimodal Hub and Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut architectures and 6 
in the Bimodal Hubs, Convergent Hubs and Convergent Hubs-plus-Shortcut architectures. The 
similarity between each result-based similarity matrix and the example-based similarity matrix 
was determined using a correlation. This resulted in a value per model run and layer subregions 
for statistical comparisons, although these equivalent values are averaged when reported. The 
values for the region with the highest similarity to the context-independent semantic 
representation were used to contrast the models (although for comparison of all regions and 
consideration of the effect of the number of units see Supplementary Note 1). Additionally, the 
number of epochs taken to train each architecture to criterion was determined for 15 runs of 
each model. For the simulations with and without control, a repeated measures ANOVA 
assessed the differences between the 7 architectures and a priori two-sided between-samples t-
tests (with Levene’s tests for equality of variance) were used to compare the effect of each 
architectural feature with Bonferroni correction for the seven multiple comparisons. All p values 
for significant contrasts are below .001 unless specified otherwise. As a difference of any 
magnitude may reach significance with a sufficient number of observations, we complement the 
statistical analyses by reporting an Hedges g (a measure of effect size for t-tests that is weighted 
by sample size) or eta squared (for ANOVAs) effect size and 95% confidence intervals.  
To determine how the Control Layer should connect to the rest of the model, two assessments 
were used. Firstly, 40 models were ran with connectivity to each layer. The emergent preference 
for receiving and employing the control signal in each layer was examined by contrasting the sum 
absolute magnitude of the weights to each layer using 3 t-tests (Spokes vs. Hidden Layer 1, 
Spokes vs. Hidden Layer 2, Hidden Layer 1 vs. Hidden Layer 2) in the deep architectures and 
one (Spokes vs. Hidden Layer 1) in the shallow architectures. Bonferroni multiple comparison 
correction for 3 contrasts was applied to the deep architectures. Secondly, the effectiveness of 
this emergent pattern was verified by only connecting the models to one layer (either the Spokes 
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Layer, Hidden Layer 1 or, where possible, Hidden Layer 2). These model versions were 
compared on their extraction of the context-independent representation structure using two-
sided between-samples t-tests and Bonferroni correction applied. 
Lesioning the Model 
To assess the effect of lesions to representation and control regions, the models were 
constructed and trained using the optimal architecture identified within Phase 2 (including 
connections from control to the Spokes Layer only). To damage representational processes, the 
connections to, from and within Hidden Layer 2 were removed as this region had the greatest 
conceptual abstraction score and thus, showed the greatest specialisation for representation 
processes. In the Control Damage simulations, Gaussian noise was added to the input to the 
control units (this noise was stable across a trial and varied between trials and model runs). This 
addition of noise was intended to simulate damage within the control system that produces this 
signal. Thus, a different mechanism of damage was employed to simulate a similar effect within 
the control system proper and the representation system (see Figure 6.A.). Three types of errors 
may be made; omission of a feature that is correct both for that concept and that context, 
commission of a feature that is in the correct context but incorrect for that concept and 
commission of a feature in the incorrect context. To allow comparison across damage type, 
controlling for the effect of damage severity, each simulation was performed at a variety of levels 
with the proportion of weights removed (for Representation Damage) or the amount of noise 
added (for Control Damage simulations) varied systematically. Then, points at which the number 
of errorful features (those further than 0.2 from the correct output) were matched across the 
damage types were identified. At the chosen levels, t-tests showed the three damage types did 
not have significantly different numbers of errors (each p>.25). This resulted in the identification 
of four damage levels at which the effect of damage type on the three possible error types could 
be assessed; Representation Damage with the removal of connections at proportions of 0, 0.1, 
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0.25, 0.3 and 0.35, and Control Damage with Gaussian noise added to the control signal with 
ranges of 0, 0.625, 1, 1.25 and 1.375. For each error type (Correct Feature-Type Commission, 
Incorrect Feature-Type Commission, Omission) an ANOVA was performed to assess the effects 
of damage type (Representation Damage, Control simulations) and damage level (No damage, 
Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4). Error types were compared across the damage types using 
two-sided independent samples t-tests at each level. As the proportion of errors of each type is 
highly similar across damage levels, only Level 3 is presented in Figure 6. The full pattern of 
results across damage levels is provided in Supplementary Note 8. The simulation data were 
compared to item-level error patterns in picture naming and fluency tasks. The picture naming 
data were previously published by Jefferies & Lambon Ralph13 and included 10 patients with SA 
and 10 with SD. Intrusion errors are associative, and context-appropriate errors are all other 
semantic errors (including category coordinate and superordinate errors). Intrusion, context-
appropriate and omission errors are provided as a proportion of these errors, excluding 
phonological errors and perseverations. The category fluency data were previously presented in 
Rogers et al.63 (without the present split of intrusion and context-appropriate errors). The data 
includes responses from 7 SD and 8 SA patients to 8 basic categories (e.g., birds). Omissions are 
based on comparison to the average correct responses of 16 age-matched neurologically-intact 
control participants. Intrusions include semantic associates, responses to a prior category and 
unrelated words. Context-appropriate errors include concepts from similar categories and 
specific-level responses. All errors are shown as a proportion of these semantic and omission 
errors, excluding phonological errors and repetitions (which could have a non-semantic cause). 
Simulating Dynamic Changes in Activation and Functional Connectivity of the Semantic 
Network 
Martin et al.,14 performed H2O15-PET on 12 participants viewing word stimuli and a further 12 
participants viewing line drawings. To simulate the univariate activation differences they 
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identified, two conditions were contrasted using the same data presented in Phase 2 – a ‘colour’ 
context (modality 1 input and modality 2 output) and an ‘action’ context (modality 1 input and 
modality 3 output). An independent-samples t-test was used to compare activation in each 
output or hidden unit between the two conditions. The p-values presented are Bonferroni-
corrected for the number of units contrasted. 
The differential connectivity of hub and spoke regions based on varying output requirements in 
Wang et al.15 was simulated in the reverse-engineered model. Simulations were identical to Phase 
2, except for the addition of a negative bias of -4 on each hidden unit to simulate the metabolic 
cost of activating neurons, as in prior imaging simulations41. The model was ran 80 times and 
activity at the final time point of each trial in context 1 (modality 1 ‘face’ input, modality 2 
output, or ‘status’) and context 2 (modality 1 ‘face’ input, modality 3 output, or ‘trait’) was 
concatenated in a different random order per model run to create a time series for each voxel, 
per context. Each run of the model is treated as a different participant. To collapse across units 
within a region, a PCA was performed per region for each context in each run, analogous to 
extracting an ROI time course for a psychophysiological interaction analysis as in Wang et al.15. 
The correlation between the time course in Hidden Layer 2 and each spoke region was calculated 
and (as a PCA result is equivalent to its reverse) the absolute value of this correlation taken as a 
measure of the functional connectivity of these regions in this context for this model run. The 
correlation values for each run were compared between context 1 and 2 for each pair of regions 
using an independent-samples t-test to assess whether there was a significant change in the 
connectivity of the hub and a spoke between the two contexts. The p-values were Bonferroni-
corrected for the three connections assessed.  
Data Availability: Data is available upon request or can be generated using the code provided. 
Code Availability: Code for replicating all simulations is available in the Supplementary Materials and online at 
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Figure 1. The seven different architectures. Each architecture is based on the shallow or deep 
configuration and has one or more of the four types of variable connections (Direct Spoke Connections, 
Bimodal Hubs Connections, Multimodal Hub Connections and Shortcut Connections). The presence or 
absence of each connection type is demonstrated using + (where present) or - (where absent). The 
connection is also shown diagrammatically using arrows in the same colour. Black arrows represent the 
connections that are stable between architectures. Although only a subset of these connections may be 
displayed, the Shallow Multimodal Hub architecture has connections between all Hidden Layer 1 
subregions. Connections between Hidden Layer 1 regions with projections from the same modality are 
shown in grey; these are part of the connectivity changes needed to construct architectures without hubs 
in this layer and are not shown in the same colour as the other changes simply as this change is necessary 
for different connections and may cause confusion as to where the key change is. Many of the 
connections shown create coherent regions in Hidden Layer 1 - these are visualised as separate regions so 
that the correspondence between the architectures is apparent. The resulting 7 architectures are provided 
with labels (italics) for reference within the text. All employ the same total number of weights and units. 
M = modality.  
 
Figure 2. The model environment. A. The full set of features for each concept. Each row is a concept and 
each column is a feature. A black box indicates that the feature is present and a white box that it is absent 
for that concept. All 16 concepts are shown here. Red boxes show features that covary strongly across 
modalities (multimodal structure) whilst the orange, yellow and green boxes highlight features that covary 
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reliably within each modality (unimodal structure). The structures expressed by the multimodal and each 
unimodal feature set are mutually orthogonal. B. A matrix showing the context-independent conceptual 
similarity structure across all modalities for the 16 items for Phase 1. Colours show the correlation 
(ranging from -1 to 1) for all pairs of vectors based on each full row of Panel A. C. Matrices showing 
correlations amongst examples used in the context-sensitive simulations in Phase 2, including (left) the 
full context-sensitive example structure for all 144 input/output patterns, (middle) the example structure 
based on all features of a concept regardless of task context (same as panel B), and (right) similarities 
based on the control signal alone regardless of the features of a concept. The 144 patterns arise from 
crossing 16 items with the 9 possible task contexts. The context-sensitive example structure is a blend of 
the context-independent conceptual structure used to measure conceptual abstraction (middle; based on 
the features of each concept only) and the context-only similarity structure (right) that indicates the 
appropriate input and output modalities regardless of concept. 
 
Figure 3. Comparing the conceptual abstraction across the architectures without (in Phase 1) and with (in 
Phase 2) the additional demand of context-appropriate output. The similarity between the context-
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independent example structure and the representations in Hidden Layer 1 (green) and Hidden Layer 2 
(orange) in 80 observations of each architecture are displayed. The higher box reflects the conceptual 
abstraction score for that model architecture. The middle bar shows the median similarity value and the 
cross reflects the mean across the different runs of the model (additional bars show the first and third 
percentile, values more than 1.5 times the interquartile range are displayed as dots, otherwise the 
minimum and maximum values are reflected by the whiskers). Planned contrasts with significant 
differences in the conceptual abstraction score are highlighted with a black line (p<.05). 
 
Figure 4. Comparing the training time across the architectures without (in Phase 1) and with (in Phase 2) 
the additional demand of context-appropriate output. The time taken to learn the examples as the 
number of epochs of training is displayed for 15 observations of each architecture. The middle bar shows 
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the median number of epochs across different runs of the model and the cross reflects the mean 
(additional bars show the first and third percentile, values more than 1.5 times the interquartile range are 
displayed as dots, otherwise the minimum and maximum values are reflected by the whiskers). A single 
outlier from the Convergent Hubs architecture is not shown as it was greater than 60000 epochs. 






Figure 5. Consequences of the location of the connection to control. For all plots, the middle bar shows 
the median number of epochs across different runs of the model and the cross reflects the mean 
(additional bars show the first and third percentile, values more than 1.5 times the interquartile range are 
displayed as dots, otherwise the minimum and maximum values are reflected by the whiskers). Significant 
differences in the planned contrasts are highlighted with a line (p<.05). A. The different ways control was 
connected to the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut architecture. This diagram is equivalent to Figure 1, yet 
simplified as the correspondence between architectures is not being highlighted. The modalities to attend 
to (i.e., those where an input is received or an output expected) are input to the 3 units in the Control 
Layer. Learnt unidirectional connections from the Control Layer allow the control signal to enter the 
semantic system at different points. Connections to all layers were present in initial simulations and the 
magnitude of weights to each layer compared. Then, the Control Layer was selectively connected to either 
the Spokes Layer (black arrow), Hidden Layer 1 (green arrow) or Hidden Layer 2 (orange arrow) and the 
results of these simulations compared. B. The emergent pattern of the absolute value of the weights from 
the control units to each layer in 40 observations of the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut architecture. C. 
The effect of connecting the Control Layer to each layer of the Multimodal Hub-plus-Shortcut 
architecture on the similarity between the context-independent example structure and the representations 
in Hidden Layer 1 (green) and Hidden Layer 2 (orange) across 80 different runs of the model. The highest 
box reflects the conceptual abstraction score. D. The time taken to learn the examples is shown as the 
number of epochs of training across 15 different runs of the model when the control signal is connected 




Figure 6. Simulating different error patterns in SD vs SA. A. The connections and inputs affected in the 
different patterns of damage. The Representation Damage simulation involved removing a proportion of 
all connections within, to and from Hidden Layer 2 (shown in green). The Control Damage simulation 
involved adding noise to the input to the control units (shown in red). B. The left panel shows the total 
proportion of errors that were omissions (“don’t know” or no response) for a cohort of 20 patients with 
damage to control regions (in SA) or representation regions (in SD) in a picture naming task, together 
with proportion of item-level error types that were omissions (target units that did not activate) in 80 
observations of the model under control vs. representation damage. The remaining panels show the total 
proportion of commission errors that involved producing context-appropriate vs context-inappropriate 
intrusion errors, for cohort of SD and SA patients in a picture naming task (20 participants) and in a 
semantic fluency task (15 participants), and for the model under damage simulating these disorders (80 
observations of each). As different damage levels result in a highly similar proportion of each error type 
only the intermediate level is shown here (see Supplementary Note 8 for further details). The two 
syndromes show equal probability of omissions in naming, but differential probability of producing 
context-appropriate and intrusion errors in both fluency and naming. The pattern of changes following 





Figure 7. Simulating dynamic changes in univariate activation and functional connectivity across contexts. 
A. Martin et al.,14found differences in and around the regions responsible for perception of colour and 
action (black) demonstrated greater activation when colour (red) or action knowledge (green) was 
required for a task. B. The reverse-engineered model simulates this effect successfully; across 80 
observations of a context where the features in modality 2 are required there is greater activation of units 
in and around this ‘colour’ spoke (red), and for 80 observations where modality 3 is the required output, 
there is greater activation of units in and around this ‘action’ spoke (green). There are no changes in the 
involvement of the input spoke or Hidden Layer 2. C. Wang et al.15 used a psychophysiological 
interaction analysis to demonstrate dynamic connectivity between the ATL hub and the spoke regions 
involved in trait or status processing when the required output shifted between these contexts. Functional 
connectivity with the input spoke did not vary. D. The reverse-engineered model demonstrated the same 
dynamic functional connectivity – whilst connectivity between Hidden Layer 2 and the input spoke (M1) 
stayed constant, the requirement to produce modality 2 features (‘status’) as output increased its 
functional connection with the hub and reduced the connectivity of the modality 3 spoke with the hub 
compared to the production of modality 3 features (‘traits’). 
 
 
 
